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D
uring the past decade or so, many
physicists have gone to Wall Street
to work in finance. While the com-
monly heard statement that “Wall
Street is the biggest single recruiter of physics
PhDs” appears to be an urban legend, physicists
working as quants—quantitative analysts—are
now unquestionably common in large invest-
ment banks and other financial businesses.
More recently, a countermovement has 
emerged as physicists have begun writing re-
search papers on finance and economics. While
this work has yet to have a major impact on
mainstream economics research, papers on fi-
nance are appearing with some frequency in
physics journals, with a few publications in ma-
jor science journals such as Nature, and occa-
sionally even in economics journals. A new
movement sometimes called econophysics has
been established. Recently, about 200 people
participated in the Third Annual Applications
of Physics in Financial Analysis Conference
(http://www.nbi. dk/APCA), held at Dublin’s
Trinity College in July 1999, where speakers
included both practitioners and academics. 
In the last five years, roughly 30 recent physics
PhDs have addressed finance topics with their
doctoral research. To paraphrase Jean-Phillipe
Bouchaud, a pioneer in this area and the advisor of
several such students: “Somebody has to train all
the physics graduates going into banking and fi-
nance, and we want it to be us, not people from
other disciplines. To do this we need to establish a
scientific presence in the field.” There is a wide-
spread feeling among members of this movement
that finance offers fertile terrain for physicists. It
might be possible, for instance, to describe the ag-
gregate behavior of financial agents using the tools
of statistical physics. Combined with a fresh point
of view, this might lead to some good science.
Not surprisingly, the few economists who have
paid any heed at all view the entry of physicists
into economics with considerable skepticism.
Economics and finance, like physics, depend on a
depth of domain-specific knowledge that takes
years to master. Many physicists working in this
area are poorly versed in the finance and eco-
nomics literature. The point of view and prob-
lem-solving approach are quite different. The
problems presented in modeling the physical and
social worlds are not the same, and it is not ob-
vious that methods that work well in physics will
also work well in economics. With some justifi-
cation, many economists think that the entry of
physicists into their world reflects merely audac-
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ity, hubris, and arrogance. Physicists are not
known for their humility, and some physicists
have presented their work in a manner that plays
into this stereotype. The cultural barrier between
the two groups will be difficult to overcome.
This schism was already evident at a confer-
ence held at the Santa Fe Institute in 1988 titled
“The Economy as an Evolving Complex Sys-
tem.”1 Roughly half the participants were econ-
omists and the other half physicists. Although
many of the physicists were largely ignorant of
economics, that did not prevent them from
openly criticizing the economists. At one point,
Nobel laureate Phil Anderson said, “You guys re-
ally believe that?” At another point, Larry Sum-
mers (now Secretary of the Treasury) accused
physicists of having a “Tarzan complex.” This
was not just a turf war. Whether due to nature or
nurture, this conference clearly showed that
there is a deep epistemological divide between
physicists and economists that is difficult to cross.
In this article, I am going to attempt a brief
critical review of some of the work done in the
past four or five years by physicists working on
problems in finance. I will not discuss work that
might be more broadly called economics, be-
cause I am too ignorant to do so. In the spirit of
full disclosure, I should make my biases clear at
the outset: My interest in finance stems from
trading financial instruments at Prediction Com-
pany, where I was one of the founders, using di-
rectional forecasting models based on time-
series analysis of historical data. According to
many mainstream economists, the highly statis-
tically significant profits we made should have
been impossible. My view of finance relies at
least as much on conversations with traders as
with academics. More importantly, my formative
religious training was in physics. I am thus a
highly biased reviewer. My only claim to impar-
tiality is a wide exposure to fields outside of
physics and a lack of involvement in the early
stages of the econophysics movement; as a new
entrant with many ideas of my own, my hope at
the outset was that none of the juicy problems
had been solved yet.
The topics presented at the Dublin econo-
physics conference included a variety of subjects,
ranging from metaphorical models to empirically
driven practical applications. I will single out a
few highlights, dividing the presentations into
four categories: empirical statistical regularities
in prices, random-process models, agent-based
models for price formation and market evolu-
tion, and practical applications, such as option
pricing, risk control, and portfolio formation.
This article was explicitly commissioned to re-
view work by physicists—a theme defined by
cultural history and kinship relations rather than
by the subject of scientific investigation. I write
this review with some reluctance. I believe that
disciplinary boundaries are dangerous and dis-
ciplines should be broken down or wholly elim-
inated. At the risk of spoiling the dramatic thread
of this story, my conclusion in reviewing this
work is that it indeed has value. That does not
mean that I wish to argue that economists should
move over and let physicists rule. Rather, I think
that physicists have something to contribute, and
I hope to encourage physicists and economists
to work together.
Empirical statistical regularities in
prices
The distribution of price fluctuations is one of
the most basic properties of markets. For some
markets the historical data spans a century at a
daily timescale, and for at least the last decade
every transaction is recorded. Nonetheless, the
price distribution’s functional form is still a topic
of active debate. Naively, central-limit theorem
arguments suggest a Gaussian (normal) distri-
bution. If p(t) is the price at time t, the log-return
r
t
(t) is defined as r
t
(t) = log p(t + t ) – log p(t). Di-
viding t into N subintervals, the total log-return
r
t
(t) is by definition the sum of the log-returns
in each subinterval. If the price changes in each
subinterval are independent and identically dis-
tributed (IID) with a well-defined second mo-
ment, under the central limit theorem the
cumulative distribution function f(r
t
) should
converge to a normal distribution for large t . 
For real financial data, however, convergence is
very slow. While the normal distribution pro-
vides a good approximation for the center of the
distribution for large t , for smaller values of t —
less than about a month—there are strong devia-
tions from normality. This is surprising, given
that the autocorrelation of log-returns is typically
very close to zero for times longer than about 15
to 30 minutes.2,3 What is the nature of these de-
viations from normality and what is their cause?
The actual distribution of log-returns has fat
tails. That is, there is a higher probability for ex-
treme values than for a normal distribution. As
one symptom of this, the fourth moment is larger
than expected for a Gaussian. We can measure
this deviation in a scale-independent manner by
using the kurtosis k = Æ (r – Æ ræ )4æ /Æ (r – Æ ræ )2æ 2 (Æ æ in-
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dicates a time average). In the early 1960s, Benoit
Mandelbrot4 (now famous as the grandfather of
fractals) and Eugene Fama5 (now famous as the
high priest of efficient market theory) presented
empirical evidence that f was a stable Levy distri-
bution. The stable Levy distributions are a nat-
ural choice because they emerge from a general-
ization of the central limit theorem. For random
variables that are so fat-tailed that their second
moment doesn’t exist, the normal central limit
theorem no longer applies. Under certain con-
ditions, however, the sum of N such variables
converges to a Levy distribution.3 The Levy
distributions are characterized by a parameter 1 £
m £ 2, where m = 2 corresponds to the special case
of a normal distribution. For m < 2, however, the
stable Levy distributions are so fat-tailed that
their standard deviation and all higher moments
are infinite—that is, Æ rq æ = ¥ for q ‡ 2. In prac-
tice, this means that numerical estimates of any
moment q = 2 or higher will not converge. Based
on daily prices in different markets, Mandelbrot
and Fama measured m » 1.7, a result that sug-
gested that short-term price changes were indeed
ill-behaved: if the variance doesn’t exist, most sta-
tistical properties are ill defined. 
Subsequent studies demonstrated, however,
that the behavior is more complicated than this.6–12
First, for larger values of t , the distribution be-
comes progressively closer to normal. Second,
investigations of larger data sets (including work
by economists in the late ’80s and early ’90s6–8)
make it clear that large returns asymptotically
follow a power law f(r) ~ |r|– a , with a > 2. This
finding is incompatible with the Levy distribu-
tion. The difference in the value of a is very im-
portant: with a > 2, the second moment (the
variance) is well defined. A value 2 < a < ¥ is in-
compatible with the stable Levy distribution and
indicates that simply generalizing the central
limit theorem with long tails is not the correct
explanation.
Physicists have contributed to this problem by
studying really large data sets and looking at the
scalings in close detail. A group at Olsen and As-
sociates, led by Michel Dacorogna, studied in-
traday price movements in foreign exchange
markets.9 Another group at Boston University,
led by Rosario Mantegna and Eugene Stanley,
has studied the intraday movements of the S&P
index.10,11 More recently, they studied the five-
minute returns of 1,000 individual stocks traded
on the AMEX, NASDAQ, and NYSE ex-
changes, over a two-year period involving
roughly 40 million records.12 In this case, they
observed the power-law scaling over about 90
standard deviations (see Figure 1). For larger val-
ues of |r|, these results dramatically illustrate that
f(r) is approximately a power law with a » 3.
Thus, the mean and variance are well-defined,
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Figure 1. Fat tails in price fluctuations: (a) Cumulative distribution of the positive and negative tails for normalized log-
returns r
t
of 1,000 of the largest US companies for 1994–1995, with t = 5 minutes.12 The returns are normalized by divid-
ing by the standard deviation for each company during this period. The solid line is a regression fit in the region 2 < r <
80. (b) The probability density function of the normalized returns. The values in the center of the distribution arise from
the discreteness in stock prices, which are important for small price movements. 
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the kurtosis clearly diverges, and the behavior of
the skewness is not so clear.
Power-law scaling is not new to economics.
The power-law distribution of wealth discovered
by Vilfredo Pareto (1848–1923) in the 19th cen-
tury predates any power laws in physics.13 And
indeed, since Pareto, the existence of power laws
has been controversial. One underlying reason
is that power-law probability distributions are
necessarily approximations. An inverse power-
law cumulative distribution f(r) ~ |r|–a with an ex-
ponent a > 0 is not integrable at zero, and simi-
larly, with an exponent a £ 0, it is not integrable
at infinity. Thus, a power-law probability distri-
bution cannot be exactly true for a variable with
an unbounded range. When they apply at all,
power-law distributions are necessarily only part
of a more complete description, valid within cer-
tain limits. (See the “Power law distribution of
wealth” sidebar for more on this topic.14)
Another reason for skepticism about power
laws in economics is that sloppy statistical analy-
sis has led to mistakes in the past. In the 1980s,
there was considerable interest in the possibility
that price changes might be described by a low-
dimensional chaotic attractor. Physics and biol-
ogy have many examples where the existence of
low-dimensional chaos is unambiguous. Why
not economics? Based on a numerical computa-
tion of fractal dimension, several researchers
claimed to observe low-dimensional chaos in
price series. Such computations are done by
measuring the coarse-grained size of a set, in this
case a possible attractor of returns in a state
space whose variables are lagged returns, as a
function of the scale of the coarse-graining. If
this behaves as a power law in the limit where
the scale is small, it implies low-dimensional
chaos. But it is very easy to be fooled when per-
forming such calculations. It is critical to test
against a carefully formulated null hypothesis.15
More careful statistical analysis by José Scheink-
man and Blake LeBaron showed that the claims
of low-dimensional chaos in price series were
not well-justified.16 While nonlinearity is clearly
present, there is no convincing evidence of low-
dimensionality. The power-law scaling that peo-
ple thought they saw was apparently just an arti-
fact of the finite size of their data sets.
The power law for large price moves is a very
different story. To detect a chaotic attractor
based on its fractal dimension in state space re-
quires a test of the distribution’s fine-grained,
microscopic properties. Low-dimensional chaos
is a very strong hypothesis, because it would im-
ply deep structure and short-term predictability
in prices. A power law in the tails of the returns,
in contrast, is just a statement about the fre-
quency of large events and is a much weaker hy-
pothesis. This becomes clear in the context of
extreme value theory. For simplicity, consider
the positive tail r fi ¥ . Under very general
conditions, there are only three possible limit-
ing behaviors, which we can classify based on the
tail index a :
1.There is a maximum value for the variable.
The distribution vanishes for values greater
than this maximum, and a < 0.
2.The tails decay exponentially and 1/ a = 0
(an example is a normal distribution).
3.There are fat tails that decay as a power law
with a > 0.
Price returns must be in one of these three cate-
gories, and the data clearly points to choice 3
with a > 2.2,6–12 Surprisingly, this implies that the
price-formation process cannot be fully under-
stood in terms of central limit theorem argu-
ments, even in a generalized form. Power-law
tails do obey a sort of partial central limit theo-
rem: For a random variable with tail exponent
a , the sum of N variables will also have the same
tail exponent a .17 This does not mean that the
full distribution is stable, however, because the
distribution’s central part, as well as the power
law’s cutoff, will generally vary. The fact that the
Power-law distribution of wealth
Sorin Solomon and various collaborators have proposed an in-
teresting idea for understanding the power-law distribution of
wealth. An old approach to such an understanding entails model-
ing an agent’s wealth at any given time as a multiplicative ran-
dom process. By taking logarithms, it is clear that in the absence
of any constraints such a process will tend toward log-normal dis-
tribution. When the mean is small compared to the standard de-
viation, an approximate power-law distribution for large wealth
arises. The problem is that the tail exponent a = 1, whereas the
observed exponent varies, but can be above 2 or even 3. Solo-
mon and his colleagues suggest that we can fix this problem by
renormalizing for drifts in total wealth and imposing a constraint
that there is a minimum relative wealth below which no one is al-
lowed to drop. The exponent of the power law is then a = 1/(1 –
c), where c is the minimum wealth expressed as a fraction of the
mean wealth. The Pareto exponent should thus be higher for
countries that have a higher floor of minimum income, meaning
a stronger welfare system.
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distribution’s shape changes with t makes it clear
that the random process underlying prices must
have nontrivial temporal structure, as I’ll discuss
next. This complicates statistical analysis of
prices, both for theoretical and practical pur-
poses, and gives an important clue about the be-
havior of economic agents and the price-forma-
tion process. But unlike low-dimensional chaos,
it does not imply that the direction of price
movements is predictable. (Also see the “Power-
law scaling” sidebar.18)
The search for a random process
model of prices
Price fluctuations are not identically distrib-
uted. Properties of the distribution, such as the
variance, change in time. This is called clustered
volatility. While the autocorrelation of log-
returns, r ( t ) ~ Æ r
t
(t + t )r
t
(t) æ , is generally very
small on timescales longer than a day, this is not
true for the volatility (which can be defined, for
example, as r2 or |r|). The volatility on successive
days is positively correlated, and these corre-
lations remain positive for weeks or months.
Clustered volatility can cause fat tails in f(r). For
example, the sum of normally distributed vari-
ables with different variances has a high kurto-
sis (although it does not have power-law tails).3
To understand the statistical properties of price
changes, we need a more sophisticated model
that accounts for the probability distribution’s
temporal variation.
Clustered volatility is traditionally described
by simple ad hoc time-series models with names
that include the letters ARCH (for AutoRegres-
sive Conditional Heteroscedasticity).19,20 Such
models involve linear relationships between the
square or absolute value of current and past log-
returns. Volatility at one time influences volatil-
ity at subsequent times. ARCH-type models can
be effective for forecasting volatility, and there is
a large body of work devoted to problems of pa-
rameter estimation, variations on the basic
model, and so forth. ARCH models are not com-
patible with all of the empirical properties of
price fluctuations, however.
A good price-fluctuations model should connect
the behavior on multiple timescales. A natural test
is the behavior of moments, in this case Æ| r
t
|qæ as a
function of q and t . Several groups report approx-
imate power-law scaling with t , with different
slopes for each value of q, as Figure 2 shows.21,22
In the jargon of dynamical systems theory, this
suggests a fractal random process. A slope that is a
linear function of q implies a simple fractal process,
and a slope that is a nonlinear function of q im-
plies a multifractal or multiscaling process. Indeed,
several different calculations seem to show that the
slope varies nonlinearly with q, suggesting that the
price process is multifractal.
These results have suggested a possible analogy
to turbulence.21 Under this analogy, velocity plays
the role of the logarithm of price and length plays
the role of time. The hypothesis is that there is an
analogy between the Kolmogorov energy cascade,
through which large vortices break up into
smaller vortices, and an information cascade, in
which financial agents with more money or
longer-term strategies influence financial agents
betting smaller sums over shorter spans of time,
inducing a cascade of volatility. This view is rein-
forced by Alain Arneodo, Jean-Francois Muzy,
and Didier Sornette, who use a wavelet decom-
position of volatility and an analysis in terms of
mutual information to argue that there is indeed a
cascade of volatility from large to small scales.23
While this is an exciting and interesting idea,
caution is in order. As Mantegna and Stanley dis-
cussed, turbulence and price fluctuations differ in
many important ways.2 There is a possible alter-
native explanation for the complicated scaling be-
havior of price fluctuations.24,3 Numerous studies
show clearly that the autocorrelation function for
volatility decays as a power law, g(t ) ~ t –n , with n
somewhere in the range 0.1 < n < 0.3.2,3,21–28 In
this case, Jean-Phillipe Bouchaud, Marc Potters,
and Martin Meyer show that the higher moments
automatically scale as sums of power laws with
different slopes. Asymptotically, the dominant
power law has an exponent proportional to q, but
for smaller values of t , another power law whose
exponent is a nonlinear function of q might dom-
inate. Thus, there is apparent multifractal behav-
Power-law scaling
Stanley’s group at Boston University has discovered a new
power-law scaling that economists apparently had not previously
observed. They show that the fluctuations in the growth rates of
companies of size S follow a power law S– b , with b ≈ 0.2 The
growth-rate fluctuation is measured by the standard deviation of
the distribution of a variety of different quantities, including sales,
number of employees, assets, and several other measures. Further-
more, they observe a similar power law with approximately the
same exponent for the GNPs of countries. This result is particu-
larly interesting because it is not explained by standard theories
(and they have proposed a new theory).
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ior, even though asymptotically the process is just
a simple fractal, with all the moments determined
by the scaling of a single moment. For a short data
set, a simple fractal process might look like a mul-
tifractal process due to slow convergence.
At this point, we can’t say which of these two
explanations is correct. Unlike fluid turbulence,
where multifractal scaling is supported by strong
theoretical evidence and by analysis of very large
data sets, the situation in finance is still not clear.
Resolution of this problem will await analysis of
longer data sets and development of better the-
oretical models. 
One thing that does seem clear is that con-
ventional ARCH-type models are incompatible
with the scaling properties of price fluctua-
tions.2,3 While ARCH-type models can indeed
give rise to fat-tailed probability distributions
with a > 2, they cannot explain other properties
of the price fluctuations.28 ARCH-type models
fit at a given timescale t do not appear to do a
good job of explaining the volatility at a different
timescale t . Furthermore, conventional ARCH
models do not have asymptotic power-law decay
in the volatility autocorrelation function. The
most likely explanation is that ARCH models are
misspecified—their simple linear structure is not
general enough to fully capture the real tempo-
ral structure of volatility. Given that they are
completely ad hoc models, this is not surprising.
There are still missing pieces and several open
questions to be answered before we will have a
good random-process model linking the behav-
ior of prices across a range of different time
scales. Physicists have contributed to the theory
and data analysis leading to the current under-
standing. They have also contributed an inter-
esting new hypothesis; even if the analogy to tur-
bulence turns out to be wrong, it has already
stimulated interesting alternatives. But to have
a good theory of how prices behave, we will need
to explain the behavior of the agents on whom
they depend. See the “Agent-based models”
sidebar for a discussion of these models.
Practical applications
Let’s now look at some of the practical appli-
cations that have come out of the physics com-
munity. Physicists have taken the fat tails of the
price distribution seriously and explored their
implications in several areas, such as risk control,
portfolio formation, and option pricing. In ad-
dition, they have made use of results on random
matrices to provide some insight into the prob-
lem of estimating correlation matrices between
different assets.
Perhaps the most direct consequence of fat tails
is their impact on risk control. With fat tails, the
probability of extreme events can be orders of
magnitude larger than it is with a normal distri-
bution. For a fat-tailed distribution, the variance is
an inadequate and potentially misleading indica-
tor of risk. Failure to take this into account can be
disastrous. This was dramatically illustrated in
October 1998 by the near failure of Long Term
Capital Management, which was apparently at
least in part due to a lack of respect for fat tails.
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Figure 2. Power-law scalings: (a) The mean moment of the absolute
daily returns Æ| r
t
|qæ plotted as a function of t for several different val-
ues of q ranging from 0.5 (top) to 2.5 (bottom).22 In a log-log repre-
sentation these appear to be approximately straight lines, suggest-
ing power-law behavior. Furthermore, the variation of this line’s
slope with q looks nonlinear, suggesting multifractal behavior. (b) As
a test of this, the ratio Æ| r|qæ /Æ| r| æ q, which is constant for a simple frac-
tal, but not for a multifractal for q = 1.5–3 (bottom to top).
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Agent-based models
The elementary building blocks of financial markets are hu-
man agents, each buying and selling based on his or her own
point of view. To have a full and fundamental description of
markets requires models that take intelligence, learning, and
complex decision making into account, not to mention emo-
tion, irrationality, and intuition.
The traditional view in economics is that financial agents
are completely rational with perfect foresight. Markets are al-
ways in equilibrium, which in economics means that trading
always occurs at a price that conforms to everyone’s expecta-
tions of the future. Markets are efficient, which means that
there are no patterns in prices that can be forecast based on
a given information set. The only possible changes in price
are random, driven by unforecastable external information.
Profits occur only by chance.
In recent years this view is eroding.1 Modern economic
theory assumes bounded rationality.2 Equilibria are dynamic,
driven by agents’ changing perceptions of each others’ ac-
tions. Allowance is made for the possibility of reasonable ex-
cess profits for agents who perform services, such as reduc-
ing risk or processing information. The behavioral economists
have presented evidence of irrational behavior and market
anomalies that historically would have allowed excess prof-
its.3 Anecdotal evidence suggests that some individuals
might indeed make statistically significant excess profits.
It is fair to say that the physicists studying these problems
tend toward the more radical end of the spectrum. While
bounded rationality is a nice idea, it is only part of the story.
People are not identical finite-capacity calculating machines
differing only in their utility functions. Equally important is the
diversity of viewpoints induced by nature and nurture. Formu-
lating successful predictive models is extremely difficult and
requires both hard work and
intelligence. To make a good
model, it is necessary to spe-
cialize, which stimulates diver-
sification of financial strate-
gies. As a result, financial
agents are very heteroge-
neous. Some agents are more
skilled than others, and the ex-
cess profits of such agents are
not necessarily reasonable.
The behavioral economists are
clearly right that people are
not fully rational and that this
can play an important role in
setting prices.3.4 But where do
we go from there? Despite the
idiosyncrasies of human psy-
chology, is there a statistical
mechanics that can explain
some of the statistical properties of the market, and perhaps
take such idiocyncracies into account?
Agent-based modeling offers one approach to addressing
these problems.5 Efforts in this direction range from simple,
metaphorical models, such as those of evolutionary game
theory,6 to complicated simulations, such as the Santa Fe In-
stitute stock market model.7,8 The SFI model, which was a
collaboration between two economists, a physicist, and a
computer scientist, was a significant accomplishment. It
demonstrated that many of the dynamical properties of real
markets, such as clustered volatility and fat tails, emerge au-
tomatically when a market simulation allows the views of the
participants to be dynamic. It was a good start, but in part
because of the complexity of the numerical simulations, it left
many unanswered questions.
The minority game
The minority game represents the opposite end of the
spectrum. Despite its simplicity, it displays some rich behav-
ior. While the connection to markets is only metaphorical, its
behavior hints at the problems with the traditional views of
efficiency and equilibrium. The minority game was originally
motivated by Brian Arthur’s El Farol problem.9,10 El Farol is a
bar in Santa Fe, near the original site of the Santa Fe Institute,
which in the old days was a popular hangout for SFI deni-
zens. In the El Farol problem, a fixed number of agents face
the question of whether or not to attend the bar. If the bar is
not crowded, as measured by a threshold on the total num-
ber of agents, an agent wins if he or she decides to attend. If
the bar is too crowded, the agent wins by staying home.
Agents make decisions based on the recent record of total
attendance at the bar. This problem is like a market in that
each agent tries to forecast the behavior of the aggregate
and that no outcome makes everyone happy.
The minority game introduced by Damien Challet and Yi-
Cheng Zhang is a more specific formulation of the El Farol
problem.11–15 At each timestep, N agents choose between
two possibilities (for example, A and B). A historical record is
kept of the number of agents choosing A; because N is fixed,
this automatically determines the number who chose B. The
only information made public is the most popular choice. A
given time step is labeled “0” if choice A is more popular and
“1” if choice B is more popular. The agents’ strategies are
lookup tables whose inputs are based on the binary historical
record for the previous m timesteps. Strategies can be
constructed at random by simply assigning random outputs
to each input (see Table A). 
Each agent has s possible strategies, and at any given time
plays the strategy that has been most successful up until that
point in time. The ability to test multiple strategies and use the
best strategy provides a simple learning mechanism. This learn-
ing is somewhat effective—for example, asymptotically A is
chosen 50% of the time. But because there is no choice that
Table A. Example of a
strategy for the minority
game. The input is based
on the attendance record
for the m previous time-
steps, 0 or 1, correspond-
ing to which choice was
most popular. In this case
m = 2. The output of the
strategy is its choice (0 or
1). Outputs are assigned
at random.
Input Output
0 0 1
0 1 0
1 0 0
1 1 1
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satisfies everyone—indeed, no choice that satisfies
the majority of the participants—there is a limit to
what learning can achieve for the group as a whole.
When s > 1, the sequence of 0s and 1s corres-
ponding to the attendance record is aperiodic. This
is driven by switching between strategies. The set of
active strategies continues to change even though
the total pool of strategies is fixed. For a given num-
ber of agents, for small m the game is efficient, in
that prediction is impossible, but when m is large,
this is no longer the case. In the limit N fi ¥ , as m
increases there is a sharp transition between the effi-
cient and the inefficient regime.
The standard deviation of the historical attend-
ance record, s , provides an interesting measure of
the average utility. Assume that each agent satisfies
his or her utility function by making the minority
choice. The average utility is highest when the two
choices are almost equally popular. For example,
with 101 agents the maximum utility is achieved if
50 agents make one choice and 51 the other. How-
ever, it is impossible to achieve this state consis-
tently. There are fluctuations around the optimal
attendance level, lowering the average utility. As m
increases, s exhibits interesting behavior, starting
out at a maximum, decreasing to a minimum, and
then rising to obtain an asymptotic value in the
limit as m fi ¥ (see Figure A). The minimum occurs
at the transition between the efficient and
inefficient regimes.
The distinction between the efficient and ineffi-
cient regimes arises from the change in the size of
the pool of strategies present in the population, rel-
ative to the total number of possible strategies. The
size of the pool of strategies is sN. The number of
possible strategies is 22
m
, which grows extremely
rapidly with m. For example, for m = 2 there are 16 possible
strategies, for m = 5 there are roughly 4 billion, and for m =
10 there are more than 10300—far exceeding the number of
elementary particles in the universe. In contrast, with s = 2
and N = 100, there are only 200 strategies actually present
in the pool. For low m, when the space of strategies is well-
covered, the conditional probability for a given transition is
the same for all histories—there are no patterns of length m.
But when m is larger, so that the strategies are only sparsely
filling the space of possibilities, patterns remain. We can inter-
pret this as meaning that the market is efficient for small m
and inefficient for large m.
The El Farol problem and minority game is a simple game
with no solution that can satisfy everyone. This is analogous to
a market where not everyone profits on any given trade. Stud-
ies of the minority game suggest that the long-term behavior
is aperiodic: the aggregate behavior continues to fluctuate. In
contrast to the standard view in economics, such fluctuations
occur even in the absence of any new external information.
Connections to financial markets
While the results for the minority game are elegant and in-
teresting in their own right, the connection to financial mar-
kets is only metaphorical. There are no prices and no trading
in the minority game, and by definition a market is a place
where prices are adjusted as trading takes place. Profits in
markets are not made by being in the minority, but rather by
anticipating the majority. To go past the metaphorical level,
we must study models of markets that involve buying and
selling assets and must be able to incrementally modify such
models by adding successively more realism. There have
been several steps in this direction.16–26 These models involve
a definition of agents, who make trading decisions, and a
price-formation rule that determines how the price changes
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Figure A. For the minority game, the standard deviation of the at-
tendance s is plotted as a function of the memory length of the
strategies.12 s is not zero, reflecting the fact that there are irregu-
lar oscillations in the attendance, with corresponding variations in
the mean utility of the players of the game.
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in response to these decisions. There is a feedback between
these two processes: decisions affect prices, which affect deci-
sions, and so forth. As a result, the prices and agents can dis-
play interesting dynamics.
Many dynamic trading models attempt to use strategies
patterned after strategies actually used in real markets (as op-
posed to arbitrary, abstract strategies that have often been
used in other game-theoretic models). The decisions are
based on information internal to the market, such as prices
and their history, and possibly information external to the
market, and can be public (such as prices) or private (such as
conversations between traders). 
Despite the wide variation in financial-trading strategies,
we can classify many of them into broad groups. Strategies
that depend only on the price history are called technical
trading or chartist strategies. The minority game strategies are
technical-trading strategies (although not of a type that is
widely used). Trend-following strategies are a commonly used
special case of technical strategies in which the holdings of
the asset positively correlate with past price movements.
Value or fundamental strategies are strategies based on per-
ceived value—that is, a model for what something ought to
be worth, as opposed to its current price. The perceived
value is inherently subjective, and from the point of view of
the models discussed here is considered external information.
Value strategies tend to buy when an asset is undervalued
and sell when it is overvalued.
Many authors have studied trend and value strategies,
with a variety of differences in the details of the implementa-
tions. Certain conclusions seem to emerge that are indepen-
dent of the details. For example, trend strategies tend to in-
duce trends and therefore positive autocorrelations in the
price,23 which was also evident in earlier work by econo-
mists.27 Several new features, however, are apparent with a
simple price formation rule that were not recognized in ear-
lier studies by economists because of the more cumbersome
framework they used to formulate the problem. For example,
trend-following strategies also induce oscillations because, to
keep risk bounded, strategies are formulated in terms of posi-
tions (holdings), whereas changes in price are caused by or-
ders, which are changes in positions. Thus, the price dynam-
ics have second-order, oscillatory terms.23 Earlier studies also
showed that trends are self-reinforcing—that trend strategies
tend to induce trends in the market.27 Some have mistaken
this to mean “the more the merrier”—that the profits of
trend strategies are enhanced by other identical trend strate-
gies. A more careful analysis disproves this. While trend
strategies indeed create profit opportunities, these opportu-
nities are for other trend strategies, not for the same trend
strategy.
A study of value-investing strategies also shows some inter-
esting results.23 Not surprisingly, most sensible value strate-
gies induce negative autocorrelations in the price. Some
value strategies cause prices and perceived values to track
each other. But surprisingly, many sensible value strategies do
not have this property. Another interesting set of questions
concerns the case where the perceived values are heteroge-
neous (that is, people have different opinions about what
something is worth). If all the strategies are linear, the market
behaves just as though there were a single agent whose per-
ceived value is the mean of the all the diverse values. If the
strategies are nonlinear, however, the diversity of views
results in excess volatility.28
All of the models I’ve discussed show certain generic phe-
nomena, such as fat tails and clustered volatility, and prelimi-
nary results suggest that it might be possible to provide a
quantitative explanation for some of the statistical properties
of prices. For example, simulations by Thomas Lux and
Michele Marchesi21 (an economist and a physicist) use trend-
following and value-investing strategies. They let agents
switch from one group to the other. They observe power-law
scaling in the tails of the log-returns, with a tail exponent a »
3, similar to that observed in real data. Other simulations also
find power-law scaling in the tails in models that allow diffu-
sion of private information.26 For all of the models discussed
in this sidebar, which allow dynamic interactions between
prices and decisions, the problem is not, “How do we get re-
alistic deviations from normality and IID behavior?” but
rather, “How do we determine the necessary and sufficient
conditions, and how do we identify which factors actually
drive such effects in real markets?”
All of these models show variations in the price, reminiscent
of boom-bust cycles. One source of these irregular cycles is 
the interaction between trend and value strategies. We can
describe one such scenario roughly as follows: Suppose the
market is strongly undervalued. The value investors buy,
thereby raising the price. As the price rises, it creates a trend,
causing trend followers to buy, raising the price even further.
As the price becomes overvalued, the value investors sell, the
trend is damped, and the trend followers eventually sell, and
so on. In practice, there are many other effects and the result-
ing oscillations are highly irregular. See Figure B for an exam-
ple illustrating the qualitative similarity of the resulting oscilla-
tions to those seen in real data. This example suggests that it
would be interesting to try to develop more quantitative mod-
els of this type to see whether they are useful for prediction.
An economist would criticize the results in the studies I’ve
cited for several reasons. A minor point concerns questions of
whether the price-formation process some of these models use
is sufficiently realistic. Use of an entirely ad hoc price-formation
rule might cause inefficiencies or spurious dynamical effects.
My results elsewhere have answered this criticism in part.23
Perhaps more persuasively, all of these dynamic trading mod-
els have qualitative features such as clustered volatility and fat
tails in common, even though the strategies and in some cases
the price formation rules are quite different. So far, no careful
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studies have compared different methods of price formation
or determined which market properties depend on the meth-
od of price formation. Perhaps the main contribution of physi-
cists here has been the use of really simple methods for price
formation, within which the dynamics are obvious and simple
examples are easily solved analytically.
As a stronger criticism, many of these models contain only
limited mechanisms for individual agents to learn, or per-
haps more important, selection mechanisms that allow the
agent population as a whole to learn. With appropriate selec-
tion mechanisms under standard dogma, the market should
become efficient and the price should be random (or at least
random enough that it is impossible for any agent to make
profits).
Shareen Joshi and I have partially addressed this criticism.24
We use a simple price-formation rule and employ the same
representation of strategies discussed earlier for the minority
game. For s > 1, the sequence of prices is aperiodic. We also
add the ability for agents to reinvest their profits and accumu-
late capital, which provides a mechanism driving
the market toward efficiency. Starting from an ar-
bitrary initial state, the agents with profitable
strategies accumulate capital. As this happens,
their market impact increases, driving their profits
down. The system approaches an attractor that in
some respects resembles a classic economic equi-
librium. Prices fluctuate irregularly. 
Although asymptotically the capital of each
agent ceases to increase, fluctuating around a
mean value, before this state is reached agents
with superior strategies accumulate capital. Unlike a classic
equilibrium, the fluctuations are not driven by external infor-
mation—the fluctuations are generated completely
internally. Furthermore, the efficiency is only partial: for a
reasonably large value of the memory, the entropy of the
prices never approaches its maximum value. There are
always patterns remaining in prices, representing profit-mak-
ing opportunities for new strategies.
This study of dynamic agent-based trading models is still
in its infancy, and many interesting problems remain to be
addressed. To make these models more convincing. more
work is needed to make them more realistic and better
grounded in economic theory.
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The growing awareness of fat tails is changing
the way people characterize risk. Ten years ago,
sophisticated quantitative trading firms character-
ized risk in terms of standard deviations. Increas-
ingly, this is changing to Value at Risk (VaR), the
size of the loss that would be experienced with an
unfavorable move of a given probability.3 The
probability level chosen is generally rather small—
for example, 1%, where the normal begins to be
a poor approximation. With a good estimate of the
probability distribution of the returns on all the
assets, we can use Monte Carlo methods to make
a VaR estimate. This can be time-consuming,
however. Jean-Phillipe Bouchaud and Marc Pot-
ters have recently offered an alternative.29
This method uses the optimal fluctuation
method from physics to simplify VaR calcula-
tions by taking advantage of the fat tails. They
expand the VaR in a Taylor series in terms of the
derivatives of the value of a portfolio with re-
spect to factors (such as principal values) and
show that when the tails decay as a power law,
higher derivatives can be neglected and a few
factors usually dominate. This simplifies the VaR
calculation, but more importantly, gives a better
understanding of what risks depend on and how
different risk factors interact.
Dealing with fat tails properly can also be im-
portant for constructing portfolios. The classic
Markowitz approach is to maximize returns sub-
ject to a constraint on the variance of the port-
folio. Although portfolio theory is often cited as
one of the great achievements of modern finance
theory, mean-variance portfolios tend to per-
form poorly in practice. Even if we assume that
the underlying assets have a normal distribution,
the portfolio weights and portfolio performance
are so sensitive to estimation errors that the
amount of data required to get good estimates
can be prohibitive. This problem is much worse
in the presence of fat tails.
Didier Sornette, Propsero Simonetti, and Jor-
gen Anderson recently introduced a new ap-
proach to portfolio formation that explicitly
takes fat tails into account.30 They make a
change of variables into normally distributed
coordinates using a simple numerical procedure
and use the correlation matrix in these coordi-
nates to form the portfolio. The resulting pro-
cedure is stabler and better conditioned than the
usual mean-variance approach. They show that
minimizing variance often increases large risks,
as measured for example by VaR. With fat tails,
an adequate prediction of the risks relies much
more on a correct description of the tail struc-
ture than on the correlations between the assets.
The implications of fat tails are important for
option pricing. An option is a financial instru-
ment that gives the holder the option to buy or
sell at a given price (the strike price) at a later time
(the expiration date). The value of an option de-
pends on the strike price and expiration date, as
well as on the underlying asset’s statistical prop-
erties. The standard method of pricing options
using the Black-Scholes formula assumes that
the log-returns of the underlying asset are nor-
mally distributed. Under the Black-Scholes for-
mula, we can compute the price of the option for
a given volatility, or alternatively, the formula
can be inverted to compute the implied volatility
based on the option price.
According to the Black-Scholes formula, the
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implied volatility should be independent of the
strike price. In practice, however, the implied
volatility depends strongly on the strike price.
For many assets, such as stocks, options with
strike prices that are in the money (near the cur-
rent price) have lower implied volatilities than
those with strike prices that are out of the
money. The implied volatility plotted against the
strike price looks like a noisy parabola called the
smile. The smile makes it clear that real option
prices deviate from the Black-Scholes formula.
The Black-Scholes pricing theory has two re-
markable features: 
• the hedging strategies eliminate risk en-
tirely, and 
• the option price does not depend on the av-
erage return of the underlying asset. 
There are very special properties that are only
true under the assumption of normality. With a
more realistic distribution for the underlying re-
turns, risk in option trading cannot be elimi-
nated and the correct option price depends on
the full distribution of the underlying asset, in-
cluding its mean. Physicists have played a lead-
ing role in developing practical and simple risk-
return methods for pricing options in a more
general context that takes into account devia-
tions from normality, as well as transaction
costs.31,32 These are based on the principle that
the proper option price minimizes (but does not
eliminate) risk. In fact, in practice the residual
risk is rather large, certainly much larger than
the zero risk predicted by the Black-Scholes pro-
cedure. This results in good predictions of the
smile. The “implied kurtosis” from such proce-
dures also agrees reasonably well with the his-
torical kurtosis. Furthermore, this procedure
does a good job of predicting the dependence of
the option price on the mean return, which is
important to many practitioners, who might
have views about the mean return. Science and
Finance, a company consisting largely of physi-
cists, has developed software employing these
principles, which a major bank known for their
expertise in pricing options is using.
Another interesting application in a somewhat
different direction concerns the computation of
correlation matrices. Correlation matrices are im-
portant for many reasons. Correlations are gener-
ally very important for hedging risks, for example,
to optimize a portfolio using the conventional
Markowitz approach. The correlation matrix for
N assets has (N(N – 1))/2 independent values.
Thus the computation of a correlation matrix is
poorly determined for any large value of N unless
the effective length T of the data sets is enormous.
For example, to estimate the daily correlations of
the stocks in the S&P index, just to have the num-
ber of data points equal the number of free para-
meters would require about 500 years of stationary
data. The S&P index has not existed that long, the
composition of companies is constantly changing,
and the nature of companies changes, so that the
relevance of price history in the distant past is
questionable. Five to 10 years is typically the
largest sensible value of T for most practical ap-
plications. Estimation errors are a big problem.
To understand the structure of correlation ma-
trices in such a highly random setting, physicists
have recently applied the theory of random ma-
http://xxx.lanl.gov/cond-mat/9903415.
16. A. Rieck, “Evolutionary Simulation of Asset
Trading Strategies,” Many-Agent Simulation and
Artificial Life, E. Hillebrand and J. Stender, eds.,
IOS Press, Amsterdam, 1994, pp. 112–136,
17. M. Levy, N. Persky, and S. Solomon, “The
Complex Dynamics of a Simple Stock Market
Model,” Int’l J. High Speed Computing, Vol. 8,
1996, p. 93. 
18. G. Caldarelli, M. Marsili, and Y.C. Zhang, “A
Prototype Model of Stock Exchange,” Euro-
physics Letters, Vol. 40, 1997, p. 479. 
19. M. Youssefmir, B.A. Huberman, and T. Hogg,
“Bubbles and Market Crashes,” Computational
Economics, Vol. 12, 1998, pp. 97–114.
20. P. Bak, M. Paczuski, and M. Shubik, “Price
Variations in a Stock Market with Many
Agents,” Physica A, Vol. 246, 1997, pp.
430–453. 
21. T. Lux and M. Marchesi, “Scaling and Critical-
ity in a Stochastic Multiagent Model of Finan-
cial Market,” Nature, Vol. 397, 1999, pp.
498–500.
22. J.-.P. Bouchaud and R. Cont, “A Langevin Ap-
proach to Stock Market Fluctuations and
Crashes,” European Physics J. B, Vol. 6, 1998,
pp. 543–550.
23. J.D. Farmer, Market Force, Ecology, and Evolu-
tion, Santa Fe Inst. Working Paper 98-12-117,
SFI, Santa Fe, N.M., 1998; http://xxx.lanl.gov/
adapt-org 9812005.
24. J.D. Farmer and S. Joshi, Evolution and
Efficiency in a Simple Technical Trading Model,
SFI Working Paper 99-10-071, Santa Fe Inst.,
Santa Fe, NM, 1999.
25. D. Stauffer and D. Sornette, “Self-Organized
Percolation Model for Stock Market Fluctua-
tions,” 1999; http://xxx.lanl.gov/cond-mat/
9906434.
26. G. Iori, “A Microsimulation of Traders Activity
in the Stock Market: The Role of Heterogene-
ity, Agents’ Interactions, and Trade Frictions,”
1999; http://xxx.lanl.gov/adp-org/0005005.
27. J.B. Delong et al., “Positive Feedback and
Destabilizing Rational Speculation,” J. Finance,
Vol. 45, 1990, pp. 379–395.
28. R. Shiller, Market Volatility, MIT Press,
Cambridge, Mass., 1989.
38 COMPUTING IN SCIENCE & ENGINEERING
trices, extensively developed in nuclear physics
and elsewhere.33,34 The eigenvalues and eigen-
vectors of random matrices approach a well-de-
fined functional form in the limit N fi ¥ . It is
then possible to compare the distribution of em-
pirically determined eigenvalues to the distribu-
tion that would be expected if the data were com-
pletely random, as shown in Figure 3. For the
correlation matrix of 406 companies in the S&P
index, in a computation based on daily data from
1991 to 1996, only seven out of 406 eigenvalues
are clearly significant with respect to a random
null hypothesis. This suggests that we can im-
prove estimates by setting the insignificant eigen-
values to zero, mimicking a common noise-re-
duction method used in signal processing.
I
have omitted quite a lot from this short re-
view. Some of this is good work that is ei-
ther out of the few main themes developed
here or that is too complicated to explain
with a small amount of space. Some is work that
is either of poor quality or simply crazy, as is typ-
ical of new fields. It also reflects a difference be-
tween the intellectual cultures of physics and
economics. Physics tends to be less restrictive
about publication. In physics, publications ap-
pear more rapidly and peer review is typically
not as strict. There is more emphasis on creativ-
ity and less on rigor. This is perhaps one of the
luxuries of natural science, where theory is easily
tested against data. Since their inception, it
seems that mystics, cabalists, and alchemists have
been attracted to the financial markets, and there
are many such people who, knowing some
mathematics, will always hover around any
group that will pay them the courtesy of lis-
tening. In any case, a field should be judged by
its best work, rather than its worst work. 
At the Dublin conference, I was initially dis-
turbed that almost all the speakers were physi-
cists. This was apparently intentional. The con-
ference’s organizers felt that during the
formative stages it is important not be too criti-
cal. Let new ideas grow and see where they lead;
thinning can take place later. In the early stages,
too much harsh criticism from economists might
be counterproductive. Given the conservatism of
many economists, there is some good sense to
this. But the time is rapidly approaching when
physicists who want to do serious work in finance
need to interact more closely with economists.
There were many bright people in Dublin and
many good ideas. There was also sometimes a
lack of grounding. Many of the physicists knew
very few empirical facts about markets and were
largely ignorant of the literature in economics
and finance. Some of the work there focused on
problems that might be fun from a mathemati-
cal point of view, but are not very relevant to un-
derstanding financial markets.
There are many fresh ideas in the work of
physicists that have been missing or underrep-
resented in economics. These will lead to new
and interesting work, and I expect rapid progress
in the next few years. This will come as physi-
cists do the hard work to master the domain
knowledge. Physicists like me need to fully un-
derstand what has already been done by econo-
mists and stop reinventing the wheel. There
have already been several good collaborations
between physicists and economists, and hope-
fully there will be many more. While there is a
hard core of conservative economists who will
never accept these new ideas, they will eventu-
ally die. The beauty of the scientific method is
that ultimately it is always possible for new ideas
Figure 3. Smoothed density of the eigenvalues l
of an empirical correlation matrix for the returns
of 406 companies in the S&P index, for the period
1991–1996.33 For comparison, this is plotted
against the theoretical density of eigenvalues if
the matrix is completely random except for its
largest eigenvalue (dotted line). A better fit is 
obtained by fitting parameters, as shown in the
solid line. The inset shows the same thing when
the largest eigenvalue, which corresponds to 
the overall market movement, is included. 
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to gain acceptance if they are right. Prediction
of empirical data based on elegant, concise sci-
entific theories will ultimately triumph over
dogma and myopia. There is no shortage of em-
pirical data to test theories in finance and eco-
nomics. The challenge for physicists is to un-
derstand the real problems, and produce theories
that fit the data. A good start has been made, but
the real challenges and adventures lie ahead.
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